⚠️ WARNING: Tor VPN is beta software. Do not rely on it for anything other than testing. It may leak information and should not be relied on for anything sensitive.
Understand the basics of Tor VPN.
Características de Tor VPN.
Entiende cómo eludir la censura de Internet con Tor VPN
Troubleshoot common issues and ways to contact support when encountering issues
Security features and properties of Tor VPN
Understand the basics of Tor VPN.
La VPN de Tor es una aplicación que utiliza tecnología Tor y que enruta otras aplicaciones en el dispositivo del usuario a través de la Red Tor. Tor VPN benefits from the privacy features of using Tor, hides your real IP address and protects you against surveillance and censorship.
⚠️ AVISO: Tor VPN es software en fase beta. Do not rely on it for anything other than testing. It may leak information and should not be relied on for anything sensitive.
The Tor network can be understood as a network of virtual tunnels that allows you to improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Tor works by sending your traffic through three random servers (also known as relays) in the Tor network. The last relay in the circuit (the "exit relay") then sends the traffic out onto the public Internet. Using the Tor network, makes it difficult to track a user's internet activity by preventing any single point on the network from being able to view both where the traffic originated from and where it is ultimately going to. It conceals the destination of the traffic (i.e. names and addresses of websites you visit) from your Internet Service Provider (ISP) and anyone watching your connection locally and the operators of the websites and services that you access and anyone watching them will see a connection coming from the Tor network instead of your real Internet (IP) address.
Tor VPN, a free and open source software developed by the Tor Project, is a Tor-powered app which can be used to route other apps on users' device through the Tor network. Tor VPN leverages the use of the Tor network routing the traffic through relays in the Tor network. Algunos de los principales usos y ventajas de usar Tor VPN:
Tor VPN is only available on Android.
Tor VPN es software libre. Free, both as in libre software, and, available free of charge. To make sure you are installing the correct Tor VPN, please only download from the official sources as mentioned below.
Tor VPN está disponible para el sistema operativo Android y requiere:
Android Tablets and Chromebooks are not supported.
Puedes instalar Tor VPN desde la Google Play Store.
Puedes instalar Tor VPN desde F-Droid.
Once installed, you can launch Tor VPN from the Play Store by clicking on "Open" or from the list of applications installed on your phone. On the "Connect" screen, by default, all applications installed on the phone are configured to route through Tor VPN with the option "All apps protected" toggled on.
Secuencia de pantalla desde primer lanzamiento para conexión Tor VPN establecida
You can configure Tor VPN to connect to the Tor network automatically with the previously saved connection settings, every time the app is launched.
Configuring Tor VPN to connect automatically on every launch.
Tor VPN debe mantenerse actualizado en todo momento. If you continue to use an outdated version of the software, you may be vulnerable to serious security vulnerabilities that can compromise your privacy and anonymity.
Puedes actualizar Tor VPN desde la tienda de aplicaciones.
Tor VPN can be uninstalled directly from Google Play Store, F-Droid or from your mobile device's application settings.
Características de Tor VPN.
By default all applications installed on your phone are configured to route through Tor VPN, except any of the Tor powered apps, like the Tor Browser for Android and Orbot.
It is also possible to permit only certain apps to use Tor VPN and route them through the Tor network.
Configurar aplicaciones para usar Tor VPN
Exit relay is the final hop in each of your Tor circuits. You can configure Tor VPN to only choose exit relays from one particular country.
When connecting with the Tor network, websites and apps will think you are connecting from the same country as your Tor exit relay.
To configure the exit location of the Tor connections:
Configure exit location of the Tor connections
The 'Kill switch' can be used to block apps from connecting to the internet if the Tor network cannot be reached.
To activate the 'Kill switch':
Configura como aparece la aplicación Tor VPN en tu teléfono.
To change the appearance of the App icon and name of the application:
Configurar cómo aparece Tor VPN en tu dispositivo.
Entiende cómo eludir la censura de Internet con Tor VPN
El acceso directo a la red Tor puede estar bloqueado. Cuando esto sucede, Tor VPN se puede usar con herramientas para eludir la censura conocidas como Puentes.
After exhausting common troubleshooting steps, if Tor VPN fails to initiate a connection to the Tor network, it is possible that your connection to Tor is censored. In that case, connecting with one of the built-in censorship circumvention methods might help.
Tor VPN incluye los siguientes tipos de puentes integrados:
Depending on where you are, one type of bridge may work better than the other.
Si no funcionan los métodos integrados onfs4 o Snowflake para eludir la censura, tendrás que solicitar otros puentes. Since bridge addresses are not public, you will need to request them yourself directly from the app:
If you have obtained bridges via Email or the Bridges website, you will have to manually add the bridges.
Configure Tor VPN to use bridges
Troubleshoot common issues and ways to contact support when encountering issues
Solución de problemas comunes al ejecutar Tor VPN.
Si Tor VPN no puede conectarse, es posible que veas un mensaje de error:
Error de Conexión en Tor VPN.
To troubleshoot, try each of the following:
Tor VPN does not support setting the DNS provider hostname manually, as doing so bypasses Tor and reveals the sites you visit to the DNS provider. When using Tor VPN, DNS resolution is done by the Tor exit relay in your Tor circuit. If you have configured a DNS hostname on your Android's Network settings, you can change them following this steps:
Dar un vistazo en el registro de Tor VPN puede ser útil para diagnosticar el problema. Para obtener el registro de Tor VPN:
00:00:00:00 W/onionmasq: onion_tunnel::runtime: Arti failed to connect to [2a00:ccc1:1:2c::1]:9000: Network is unreachable (os error 101)
00:00:00:00 W/onionmasq: tor_chanmgr::transport::default: Connection to [scrubbed] failed: error: Network is unreachable (os error 101)
00:00:00:000 E/onionmasq: onionmasq_mobile::ffi: runProxy() returned error: couldn't start onionmasq proxy
00:00:00:000 CONNECTION_ERROR
00:00:00:000 D/onionmasq: onionmasq_mobile: closing proxy...
In this case, trying one of the censorship circumvention methods might work.
How to contact support, report a bug or give feedback.
Si encuentras algún problema que no se responda en nuestra documentación, intenta los pasos de Solución de problemas. If that does not work, please file a bug report or contact our support team.
Al enviarnos una solicitud de ayuda, comentarios o reportar un error, incluye la mayor cantidad de información posible:
On Tor Forum, create an account to submit a new topic. Revisa nuestras directrices de discusióny comprueba los temas existentes antes de preguntar.
When reporting a bug, please check if the bug has already been reported. Para buscar y ver todos los informes de defectos relacionados con Tor VPN, navegue al repositorio de VPN Tor. To create a new bug report, please request a new account to access Tor Project's GitLab instance or alternatively use the Anon-Ticket portal. Crea un reporte en el repositorio Tor VPN.
Send us a message on @TorProjectSupportBot.
Envíanos un email a frontdesk@torproject.org
En la línea de asunto de tu correo electrónico, por favor dinos qué estás reportando. The more specific your subject line is, the easier it will be for us to understand and follow up. A veces cuando recibimos correos electrónicos sin líneas de asunto, se marcan como spam.
Send us a message on +447421000612.
Send us a message on +17787431312.
Security features and properties of Tor VPN
This document provides insights into the security characteristics of Tor VPN, describes the nature of the benefits that Tor VPN provides and when they apply. The intended audience for this threat model document includes developers, UX designers, documentation writers, technical trainers, and technical users.
August 6, 2025
Similar to Tor Browser, and unlike traditional VPNs, Tor VPN gives each application its own route through the Tor network. This feature prevents network adversaries from linking a user's private activity with their non-private activity.
In contrast to Tor Browser, the privacy benefits that Tor VPN provides depend highly upon the behavior of individual applications, the permissions granted to those applications, and the configuration of the base Android system.
For privacy-hostile applications in partial Tor mode, or for applications that users only occasionally use with Tor, Tor VPN provides only censorship circumvention and protection from network surveillance.
When used on properly configured privacy-enhanced Android distributions such as GrapheneOS, Tor VPN can provide additional privacy benefits even for privacy-hostile applications.
This document describes the nature of the benefits that Tor VPN provides and when they apply.
The Tor VPN threat model uses the ICTM methodology. ICTM specifies security invariants that the user can expect when using the software in a particular way or in a particular environment. An ICTM threat model starts from a point of "No Security" and adds security invariants when the software environment meets particular requirements.
We express what Tor VPN provides in terms of ICTM security invariants, which apply to specific application types and usage scenarios.
In our usage of ICTM, we define five ICTM security invariants that represent levels of privacy that Tor VPN provides. This document links these invariant terms in Capitalized Bold Italic to their definition sections.
These security invariants apply to the combination of four types of Android applications, two modes of Tor VPN (all-app or per-app), and five Android device configurations. This document links these classification terms in Capitalized Bold to their definition sections.
The combined outcome results in two threat model matrices that represent the ICTM security invariant that is active in a given situation.
The level of pseudonymity that Tor VPN provides to the user guides the overall threat model.
Tor VPN provides at least censorship circumvention to all selected apps.
Tor VPN does not magically make all apps anonymous or pseudonymous. If the user used their real name or even created their account without Tor, then they have no pseudonymity.
If the user uses a privacy-enhanced version of Android and is careful about their Google account setup and app usage, then Tor VPN can help protect the usage of a single pseudonym for the user of the device. (The user may try to use different names in different apps, but app behavior can link these pseudonyms to the Google account and/or to each other).
If the user uses privacy-preserving apps with proper configuration, then Tor VPN can enable the usage of separate pseudonyms in those apps. (When properly configured, an adversary cannot link the different pseudonyms used in distinct privacy-preserving apps).
Essentially, this threat model describes the circumstances under which the user obtains these different levels of pseudonymity protection.
The low-level VPN security properties and the ICTM security invariants support the Tor VPN threat model.
Two low-level security properties that the OnionMasq networking daemon provides support the ICTM security invariants. These low-level security properties must hold for the ICTM invariants to apply:
Network Leak Safety. Apps MUST NOT be able to bypass the VPN when it is enabled. This includes during device startup, if the VPN is not connected yet, or if the network is temporarily disconnected. The VPN industry calls this property a "Kill Switch", "Always On VPN Lockdown", or "On Demand". The Always-on Lockdown feature of Android 8 and above provides this property.
Network App Isolation. All network activity of each Tor-routed app MUST be isolated from other apps by using its own dedicated Tor circuit(s). Specific apps MAY bypass Tor entirely if the user chooses to allow this. Las API de ConnectivityManager de Android 10 y superiores proporcionan esta propiedad.
These are the security invariants that Tor VPN is capable of providing to individual apps. To simplify activation conditions, some invariants inherit the properties of earlier ones. We list these inherited invariants under each invariant.
The high-level conceptualization to keep in mind is that we are defining distinctions in the level of pseudonymity that the user can expect for an app: no pseudonymity, multi-app shared pseudonymity, per-app pseudonymity, and anonymity.
The next section lists the activation conditions under which they apply.
NOTE: Linkable Pseudonymity is a fragile state. As pseudonymous activity is linked together, the odds increase that there is some way to deanonymize some of that activity, thus deanonymizing all of it. One can conceptualize this invariant as providing "Multi-App Shared Pseudonymity," where all apps with Linkable Pseudonymity on the device effectively share the same pseudonym. This is why we require either the Pseudonymous Google Configuration or Google-Free Configuration for apps to gain this invariant. (Pseudonymity would otherwise vanish as soon as it was linked to a non-pseudonymous Google account.)
NOTE: One can conceptualize this invariant as providing "Per-App Pseudonymity." Because of Tor VPN's Network App Isolation, when this invariant is active for an app, its activity cannot be linked to non-private activity on the device. This is not the case for traditional VPNs, which allow the VPN operator and VPN endpoint observers to link such activity.
Our security invariants activate depending on what type of app is in use, the Tor VPN mode (per-app or all-apps), and properties of the base OS and configuration.
The lowest numbered invariant where an app matches these clauses is the invariant for that app.
A device may have multiple apps operating at different security invariant levels, depending on these conditions.
The Threat Model Matrices present this same activation information in table form.
Rationale: Surprisingly, this is a common failure mode for VPN apps among people who do not understand how they work.
Rationale: We cannot provide any additional security to a device that is already vulnerable to unfixed, publicly disclosed security flaws. We assume these public flaws can subvert any privacy or security properties the user would hope to gain by running Tor VPN.
Rationale: In per-app mode, apps that are not selected for Tor use get no protection. (Though they could if we implemented a per-app network block feature).
Rationale: Privacy-hostile applications can trick the user into opening URLs in apps that are not selected to use Tor and can link non-Tor activity to their activity.
Rationale: On all versions of Android, Privacy-hostile applications can use the
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATEAndroid permission to determine the SIM card IP address and can engage in data sharing with the ISP, which removes Network Privacy. On Stock Google Android (but not GrapheneOS), they can bind to the cell network interface to directly bypass the VPN for arbitrary network connections.
Rationale: We assume unmasked apps have no pseudonymity.
Rationale: Privacy-hostile apps can link their activity to the user's real name and Google account unless the user takes further steps.
Rationale: Pseudonym-friendly apps can be accidentally linked to a user's real name and Google account through push notifications, phone number authentication, and other mechanisms, unless the user takes further steps.
Rationale: The usage of Google push notifications links the pseudonymous app to the device's Google account, which is also pseudonymous in this configuration.
Rationale: Privacy-hostile apps can cooperate with other privacy-hostile apps on the phone to link activity, even without a device Google account.
Rationale: These device configurations prevent linkability of the pseudonymous app to the device's Google account.
Rationale: This device configuration isolates privacy-hostile apps from the device's Google account and from each other.
Rationale: Anonymity apps have no other identifiers other than the current IP address, which is now a Tor exit IP address.
As can be seen, our security invariants depend upon the app type and the Android device configuration. In this section, we define those applications and configurations specifically.
We classify Android applications into four types:
NOTE: Once an app is unmasked on a device, creating a new pseudonymous account in the same app does not remove this classification. In fact, due to the Android ID identifier behavior, deleting the app and reinstalling it in the same profile still allows a new pseudonym to be linked to the deleted one. A user must use the Isolated User Profile Configuration to create a new device user profile to use the app in an unlinkable way with respect to the current profile's Android ID for that app.
Architecturally, Tor VPN is capable of providing a high degree of unlinkability to applications on the same device, as we can see from the security invariants. Unfortunately, Android is an extremely privacy-invasive platform. The Android ecosystem has been built upon the same advertising model that the web has been built upon. Because Google controls Android and is the primary benefactor (if not sole conduit) of Android advertising revenue, Google designed the platform to maximize the ability to track usage and to link user activity together to build a comprehensive advertising profile of the user. This linkability is problematic even for apps that provide pseudonymity as a design goal, merely through their usage of the system APIs. The primary way that the system subverts pseudonymity is by associating the pseudonym with the Google account, most often through push notifications, but also through associating location information with the Android Advertising ID. On a stock Google Android, the device's Google account gets full device information: serial number, IMEI, IMSI, phone number, WiFi MAC address, full location history, and installed application list. We assume that any linking mechanism to the stock Android Google account provides deanonymization of a pseudonym. In these cases, apps can gain Network Privacy at most. The good news is that there are ways of configuring an Android device that improve the ICTM security invariant that Tor VPN can provide:
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission, which gives access to all IP addresses on the device, along with a lot of other network interface information that can be used to track the user. For a good overview of all the information that is available by default, install Network Analyzer or use the Device ID test in our VPN Test App. Unfortunately, even privacy-preserving Android distributions such as GrapheneOS do not provide the ability to redact non-VPN network information and non-VPN IP addresses when a VPN is active. Additionally, on stock Android, apps can bypass the VPN interface by binding to the cell network interface, regardless of Always-on and Block Connections Android settings. Until those tickets are fixed:
When these properties are met, the app will not be linked to the device's Google account, which is a common source of deanonymization.
NOTE: Removing push notification permission is NOT ENOUGH to prevent apps from being able to register with Firebase (Google) to receive a push token that links the app to the Google account. See the Push Notification section of Known Weaknesses for more information. For now, if an app does not provide settings to disable notification registration, then you must use one of the following configurations instead. (For example: Session Messenger allows push registration to be disabled or switched to non-Google; Signal currently offers no such configuration).
It turns out that from the point of view of our ICTM security invariants, both of these are equivalent: they both result in Linkable Pseudonymity for both pseudonym-friendly apps and privacy-hostile apps because they significantly reduce the amount of linkable information, but they do not eliminate it. The primary reason is due to the remaining push notification linkability. See the Push Notification Linkability section of Known Weakness for more info. If the push notification linkability weakness is mitigated, then pseudonym-friendly apps will have Unlinkable Pseudonymity in this configuration when using push notifications. The first option accepts linkability through the Google account but mitigates deanonymization through careful management of this Google account. In this configuration, the user creates a new Google account over Tor and relies on the GrapheneOS Google Sandbox to provide pseudonymity for the device's Google account. In this sandbox, the system treats Google as a normal app, with revocable permissions and no access to hardware identifiers. Additionally, GrapheneOS requires the user to manually disable the Android Advertising ID. Doing so eliminates a large source of excess linkability. The Android Advertising ID is heavily used to link pseudonyms to location data. In the second option, the user configures a new privacy-enhanced Android device without a Google account but still uses push notifications with sandboxed Google Play Services on GrapheneOS. The user can use F-Droid or Aurora Store to install apps without a Google account. Without a Google account, there is less linkability risk between apps through other Google APIs other than push.
NOTE: The device must always use Tor to avoid linking its device push registration to a non-Tor IP address. This may be problematic in censorship scenarios where configuration information is delivered over push notifications. In this case, without a device Google account, it may be possible to clear registration data and re-register to remove linkability. But the effectiveness of this will depend on the data retention duration of the services involved for expired push tokens. See the Push Notification Linkability section of Known Weaknesses.
- These properties define this configuration:
- Configure with the IP Address Privacy Configuration to prevent Google Services and hostile apps from using the cell IP address for linkability.
- Optional Google Account Config:
- Create a new pseudonymous Google account over Tor for the device, using an SMS or VoIP phone number.
- The Android Advertising ID of this account has been disabled.
- Do not use the device phone number or Google account for app registration. Use a different online SMS or VoIP provider over Tor.
- If Tor VPN is in per-app mode, all Google Play Services and Google apps must be selected to use Tor in this configuration.
- Disable Private DNS and Connectivity Checks.
The active security invariant for a given scenario can be summarized in two matrices: one for Tor VPN per-app mode and one for Tor VPN all-app mode. These two matrices exactly represent the ICTM security invariant clauses from Section 2.3.
In this section, we list the known weaknesses of both stock Android and privacy-enhancing Android, where fixing a weakness would significantly improve the available security invariants.
For each weakness, we list the Consequences for the user and the mitigating configurations the user must perform, when possible.
We also provide fix Recommendations for developers of GrapheneOS, Android, and pseudonym-friendly apps.
The following Android privacy issues apply to all Android versions, including GrapheneOS and CalyxOS.
In all versions of Android, when apps have the ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission (which nearly all Android apps have), they can examine properties of all network interfaces, including the IP address. For a good overview of all the information that is available by default, install Network Analyzer or use our VPN Leak Test App.
Consequences: This weakness prevents Tor VPN from providing Network Privacy (or further invariants) to Privacy-hostile apps. This weakness also exposes the user to IP address leaks even for Pseudonym-friendly apps that disclose all device IP addresses during WebRTC calls. In both cases, the user must use their phone with a mobile WiFi hotspot, rather than a SIM card, to mitigate this weakness.
Recommendation: When a VPN is enabled, the Android OS should simulate non-VPN interfaces as disconnected, or it should spoof unused RFC1918 addresses for non-VPN interfaces. If addresses are spoofed, the system should not provide the same values to all apps, to prevent the use of spoofed values as identifiers (which likely already happens with IP address values today). These mitigations are essential because they enable VPNs to provide Network Privacy. Most VPN users naturally want their IP addresses to be unavailable to apps for tracking purposes.
All versions of Android (and also all versions of iOS) are currently subject to linkability through push notifications, even when the user has denied push notification permission to all apps.
When registering for Google's Firebase push notifications, apps obtain an FCM "token" from Firebase, which they submit to their servers. Their servers use this token to deliver messages to Google, who then uses the token ID to look up the device and send it the message.
Our VPN Leak Test App verifies that this registration ability is possible without any push notification permission, in the Device ID test.
This means that a series of record requests (sent first to the app developers and then to Google) will discover the Google account in use with a particular app. From there, even if there is no device Google account, the other push tokens associated with the device can be used to make further record requests to other app service providers for account data associated with their respective token IDs.
Because Google (and many apps) operate internationally, these requests can come from arbitrary jurisdictions. The Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law in China is one such example of a law that can be used for this purpose, although no direct reports of China using push notifications have been made public. It seems likely that Wyden's concerns did not come from nowhere, though.
This linkability is possible even for apps like Signal that do not send any actual content in the push notification and use it only as a wake-up notification. Because Signal still stores the token ID with the user's account on their servers, this linkability also exists for them.
This makes it impossible to have distinct pseudonyms for Signal, or any other app that registers with FCM, unless the user configures their device without Google Play Services or creates a separate user profile without Google Services for these apps.
Consequences: This weakness makes the Pseudonymous App Configuration impossible for many apps, because FCM push registration cannot actually be disabled by the user by denying push notification permission to an app. It also makes Pseudonymous Google Configuration have far more app linkability to the Google account (or device) than would otherwise be the case, linking many privacy-hostile apps to Google and to other pseudonym-friendly apps. The user has no real mitigation options, because disabling push notifications still allows this registration and resulting linkability.
Recommendations:
There are a few different approaches that can reduce the user's exposure to this linkability:
In our testing, we discovered that apps can bypass the VPN by using mDNS requests and SSDP activity. We have a reproduction case in our VPN Leak Test App. This test leaks on all versions of Android, including GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS has attempted to fix some multicast leaks, but our test app shows that these fixes are insufficient.
Additionally, these multicast leaks enable privacy-hostile apps to communicate on a local network, further linking user pseudonyms to other app activity on that same network.
This behavior is also observed in the wild, with Spotify engaging in communication over the local network through this bypass mechanism.
Consequences: This weakness allows Privacy-hostile apps to communicate on the local network to link their usage to other users on the network.
Recommendation: The Android OS should route this multicast behavior through the VPN interface. This will enable the VPN app to decide whether to allow these local network connections.
The Android ID is essentially a 64-bit identifier that is shared by all apps in a user profile with the same signing key.
This identifier persists across re-installations of the same app, which can be verified using our VPN Leak Test App using the Device Identifier test. Users who expect to be able to delete an app and then reinstall it to sign in under a different pseudonym will have their pseudonyms linked by Privacy-hostile apps that make use of this identifier.
Consequences: This weakness prevents users from being able to reinstall apps to change pseudonyms without linking those pseudonyms together. Basically, due to this weakness, once an app is linked to the user's real identity on a profile, that app will always be an Unmasked App, even after reinstallation. Users must install that app in a separate profile to avoid this linkability.
Recommendation: This ID should be randomized with every app installation, rather than persisting after uninstallation. This will allow users to delete an app to change pseudonyms.
For some reason, no Android permissions are necessary to determine the cell network ID and the provider name of the user's SIM card. This information can be used to determine the user's rough geographic location, depending on the range of the cell provider (typically at least country-level, but sometimes regional, state, or province-level). The Device ID test of our VPN Leak Test app displays this information. It is also visible in Network Analyzer.
Consequences: This weakness does not directly impact any of our privacy invariants, but it is generally bad for privacy.
Recommendation: These APIs should always return NULL/empty (the default when no eSIMs are configured), because this information is not necessary for app operation.
We observed that when WiFi calling is enabled for an activated eSIM, the device makes IPsec connections to the eSIM provider, bypassing the VPN.
Consequences: This weakness does not directly impact any of our privacy invariants, but it is generally bad for privacy in that it exposes the user's WiFi IP address to their cell network.
Recommendation: Allow VPN interfaces control of routing this connection, so that it may be disabled if the user chooses to block it.
Stock Android has a number of edge cases that can leak DNS or multicast, which can remove the Network Privacy invariant by revealing to the local network that a particular app may be in use.
Stock Android allows apps to bind to the cell network interface and then connect to an IP address, bypassing any VPN in place, regardless of Always-On or Block Connections VPN settings. Our VPN Test App has a reproduction case for this as part of the Leak Test. This leak is only possible over the cell network interface.
GrapheneOS fixed this issue in the 2025072700 Release.
Consequences: This leak allows Privacy-hostile apps to remove Network Privacy on stock Android. Users must use the IP Address Privacy Configuration and/or use GrapheneOS to prevent this leak.
Recommendations: Google shouldn't allow rogue apps to bind to the cell interface to bypass the VPN in Lockdown Mode, because VPN users expect that apps can't bypass the VPN in this mode.
On stock Android, user profile isolation can leak packets upon first use after restart.
Consequences: This leak prevents stock Android users from successfully using Isolated User Profile Configuration to isolate sensitive app activity. Users have to install GrapheneOS to mitigate this.
Recommendation: These leaks should be fixed, because users expect Always on VPN and Block Connection settings to work in all user profiles.
On stock Android, the device Google account has access to all hardware identifiers, as well as SIM card identifiers and phone number. This access typically means that any form of linking to the device Google account (through push notifications, Gmail use, or Google OAuth sign-in) typically means deanonymization of a pseudonym.
Consequences: It is difficult for a user to maintain a pseudonym even in Pseudonym-friendly apps without careful configuration.
Recommendations: Both privacy-conscious apps and Google should have more transparency with respect to actions that link the app's account to the device Google account, because users tend to expect that pseudonymity is not actively subverted behind their backs. In the meantime, the GrapheneOS Google Sandbox enables Pseudonymous Google Configuration.
Multiple issues with DNS exist in stock Android. Apps that use getaddrinfo() from the C library can bypass the VPN. Our VPN Leak Test app reproduces this leak as part of the main Leak Test.
Additional, DNS leaks can happen if the VPN malfunctions or shuts down.
Consequences: DNS leaks can erode Network Privacy by allowing local ISPs to determine which apps are in use. Users must use GrapheneOS to avoid these leaks.
Recommendations: GrapheneOS has fixed these issues. Google Android should upstream these fixes, because users expect that their DNS activity will not bypass their VPN.
Android has a secure setting Settings.Secure.always_on_vpn_lockdown_whitelist, which allows custom Android builds to define a list of apps that always bypass the VPN, regardless of VPN settings. Google and GrapheneOS both have this setting empty, but third-party Android builds may place their apps in this setting. The ReThink Firewall App has a ticket describing this issue.
Google Android also allows connectivity checks to bypass the VPN. GrapheneOS provides a setting to disable this.
Consequences: On Android rebuilds, various vendor apps may be exempted from the VPN, allowing them to connect outside of it. Users must use GrapheneOS to avoid these leaks.
Recommendations: Users should disable or remove vendor apps that they don't need.
The following weaknesses are unique to GrapheneOS. Note that the universal Android weaknesses also apply to GrapheneOS.
Additionally, the default-on behavior of the Android Advertising ID is another source of linkability between apps. GrapheneOS requires users to manually disable this ID, but this is not prominently documented during setup.
A better default would be to have the Android Advertising ID disabled by default or to provide a prominent setup step that educates users about this privacy risk.
We list this as a GrapheneOS-specific weakness because other privacy-preserving versions of Android randomize this ID automatically.
Consequences: Users who are not aware that they need to configure their Google account to disable this identifier will have all of their Privacy-hostile app activity linked to their Google account and to each other. Users must manually disable the Advertising ID in their Google account settings.
Recomendación: De manera similar a como GrapheneOS hace de proxy para las API de ubicación, esta API debería estar redirigida para devolver un número aleatorio o cero, porque esta API es una fuente extremadamente invasiva de vinculación que permite la agregación de datos de ubicación y uso en todas las aplicaciones.
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Hay varias formas de contactar con nosotros, usa la que mejor te parezca.
Recomendamos que pidas ayuda en el Tor Forum. Necesitarás crear una nueva cuenta para crear un nuevo tema. Antes de preguntar, por favor revisa nuestra discussion guidelines. Por el momento, para obtener una respuesta más rápida, escribe en inglés. Si encontraste un problema, por favor usa GitLab.
Primero, comprueba si el error ya es conocido. Puedes buscar y leer todos los reportes en https://gitlab.torproject.org/. Para crear una cuestión nueva, solicita una cuenta para acceder a la instancia de GitLab del Proyecto Tor, y encuentra el repositorio correcto para reportar tu problema. O puedes informar de fallos, o enviarnos comentarios anónimamente a través del Anon Ticket sin necesidad de crear una cuenta. Rastreamos todas las cuestiones relacionadas con el Navegador Tor en el rastreador de cuestiones del Navegador Tor. Los problemas con nuestros sitios web deberían reportarse en el bugtracker de Web.
Si necesitas ayuda instalando o solucionando un problema con el Navegador Tor y el foro de Tor está bloqueado o censurado allí donde te encuentras, puedes contactar con nosotros en Telegram https://t.me/TorProjectSupportBot. Un especialista de Tor te asesorará.
Puedes contactar con nuestro equipo con un mensaje de texto a nuestro número de WhatsApp: +447421000612. Este servicio sólo está disponible para mensajes de texto; no se permiten videos o llamadas.
Puedes obtener ayuda enviando un mensaje de texto a nuestro número de Signal: +17787431312 o nuestro usuario de Signal, @torsupport.89. Signal es una aplicación de mensajería gratuita y enfocada en la privacidad. Este servicio sólo está disponible para mensajes de texto; no se permiten videos o llamadas. Tras enviar un mensaje, nuestros agentes de asistencia te guiarán y te ayudarán a solucionar tu problema.
Envíanos un email a frontdesk@torproject.org.
En la línea de asunto de tu correo electrónico, por favor dinos qué estás reportando. Cuanto más específica sea tu línea de asunto (ej.: "Falla de conexión", "comentario sobre sitio web", "comentario sobre Navegador Tor", "necesito un puente"), más fácil será para nosotros entender y hacer el seguimiento. A veces, cuando recibimos correos electrónicos sin líneas de asunto, son marcados como no solicitados, y no los vemos.
Para una respuesta más rápida, por favor escribe si puedes en Inglés, Español y/o Portugués. Si ninguno de estos lenguajes es posible para tí, por favor escribe en cualquier lenguaje con el que te sientas cómodo, pero ten en mente que nos va a tomar un poco más responder, ya que vamos a necesitar ayuda con la traducción para entenderlo.
Siempre puedes dejar comentarios en el artículo del blog que esté relacionado con la cuestión o comentario que quieres reportar. Si no hay un artículo relacionado con tu cuestión, por favor contáctanos de otra manera.
Puedes encontrarnos en el canal #tor en OFTC o en #tor:matrix.org para hacer comentarios o reportar fallos/problemas. Puede que no respondamos enseguida, pero comprobaremos la lista acumulada, y te responderemos en cuanto nos sea posible.
Aprende cómo conectarte a los servidores OFTC.
Para reportar cuestiones o comentarios usando listas de correo electrónico, te recomendamos que lo hagas en la que está relacionada con lo que te gustaría reportar. Un directorio completo de nuestras listas de correo puede ser encontrado aquí.
Para expresar tu opinión o si tienes problemas al administrar un repetidor: tor-relays
Si ha encontrado un fallo de seguridad, por favor envíe un correo electrónico a security@torproject.org.
Si quieres encriptar tu correo electrónico puedes conseguir la clave pública de OpenPGP para esta dirección en keys.openpgp.org. Aquí está la huella actual:
835B 4E04 F6F7 4211 04C4 751A 3EF9 EF99 6604 DE41
Si quiere participar en nuestro programa de recompensas por errores, tenga en cuenta, enviar un fallo de seguridad a una página web de terceros conlleva ciertos riesgos que no podemos controlar, es por ello que preferimos que nos informe directamente.
Descubre como conectar con el Proyecto Tor para asistencia, informe de defectos y comentarios.
Al enviarnos una solicitud de ayuda, comentarios o reportar un error, incluye la mayor cantidad de información posible:
De lunes a jueves: nuestros canales de atención al usuario en correo electrónico, Telegram, WhatsApp y Signal están operativos.
De viernes a domingo: la línea de ayuda está cerrada. Nuestro equipo responderá el lunes.
Hay varias formas de contactar con nosotros, usa la que mejor te parezca.
Tenemos varios bots y canales oficiales en Telegram:
Recomendamos pedir ayuda en el Foro de Tor. Necesitarás crear una cuenta para crear un nuevo tema. Por favor revisa nuestras directrices de discusión y comprueba los temas existentes antes de preguntar. Por el momento, para obtener una respuesta más rápida, escribe en inglés. Si has encontrado un bug, usa por favor GitLab.
Puedes contactar con nuestro equipo con un mensaje de texto a nuestro número de WhatsApp: +447421000612. Este servicio sólo está disponible para mensajes de texto; no se permiten videos o llamadas.
Puedes obtener ayuda enviando un mensaje de texto a nuestro número de Signal: +17787431312 o nuestro usuario de Signal, @torsupport.89. Signal es una aplicación de mensajería gratuita y enfocada en la privacidad. Actualmente, nuestro canal de ayuda está disponible en inglés, ruso y persa; y se centra en ayudar a los usuarios de Tor en regiones con censura. El servicio está disponible solo para mensajes de texto; no se admiten vídeos o llamadas. Tras enviar un mensaje, nuestros agentes de asistencia te guiarán y te ayudarán a solucionar tu problema.
Envíanos un email a frontdesk@torproject.org
En la línea de asunto de tu correo electrónico, por favor dinos qué estás reportando. Cuanto más específica sea tu línea de asunto (ej.: "Falla de conexión", "comentario sobre sitio web", "comentario sobre Navegador Tor", "necesito un puente"), más fácil será para nosotros entender y hacer el seguimiento. A veces, cuando recibimos correos electrónicos sin líneas de asunto, son marcados como no solicitados, y no los vemos.
Para una respuesta más rápida, escribe, si puedes, en inglés, ruso, persa, español, hindi, bangla y/o portugués. Si ninguno de estos lenguajes es posible para tí, por favor escribe en cualquier lenguaje con el que te sientas cómodo, pero ten en mente que nos va a tomar un poco más responder, ya que vamos a necesitar ayuda con la traducción para entenderlo.
Puedes encontrarnos en el canal #tor en OFTC o Canal de Ayuda de Usuario de Tor en Matrix. Puede que no respondamos enseguida, pero revisamos las notas y respondemos cuando podemos.
Aprende cómo conectarte a los servidores OFTC.
Primero, comprueba si el error ya es conocido. Puedes buscar y leer todos los reportes en https://gitlab.torproject.org/. Para crear un nuevo ticket, solicita una cuenta para acceder a la instancia de GitLab del Proyecto Tor, y encuentra el repositorio correcto para reportar tu problema. Rastreamos todas las cuestiones relacionadas con el Navegador Tor en el rastreador de cuestiones del Navegador Tor. Los problemas con nuestros sitios web deberían reportarse en el bugtracker de Web.