⚠️ PERINGATAN: Tor VPN adalah perangkat lunak beta. Jangan mengandalkannya untuk hal lain selain pengujian. Hal ini dapat membocorkan informasi dan tidak boleh diandalkan untuk sesuatu yang sensitif.
Pahami dasar-dasar Tor VPN.
Fitur Tor VPN.
Pahami cara mengatasi sensor internet dengan Tor VPN
Troubleshoot masalah umum dan cara menghubungi dukungan saat mengalami masalah
Fitur dan properti keamanan Tor VPN
Pahami dasar-dasar Tor VPN.
Tor VPN adalah aplikasi yang didukung oleh Tor yang mengarahkan aplikasi lain di perangkat pengguna melalui Jaringan Tor. Tor VPN memanfaatkan fitur privasi yang ditawarkan oleh Tor, menyembunyikan alamat IP asli Anda, dan melindungi Anda dari pengawasan dan sensor.
⚠️ PERINGATAN: Tor VPN adalah perangkat lunak beta. Jangan mengandalkannya untuk hal lain selain pengujian. Hal ini dapat membocorkan informasi dan tidak boleh diandalkan untuk sesuatu yang sensitif.
Jaringan Tor dapat dipahami sebagai jaringan terowongan virtual yang memungkinkan Anda meningkatkan privasi dan keamanan Anda di Internet. Tor bekerja dengan mengirimkan lalu lintas Anda melalui tiga server acak (juga dikenal sebagai relay) dalam jaringan Tor. Relay terakhir dalam rangkaian ("relay keluar") kemudian mengirimkan trafik keluar ke Internet publik. Menggunakan jaringan Tor, mempersulit pelacakan aktivitas internet pengguna dengan mencegah satu titik pun dalam jaringan untuk dapat melihat dari mana lalu lintas berasal dan ke mana tujuannya. Tor menyembunyikan tujuan lalu lintas (yaitu nama dan alamat situs web yang Anda kunjungi) dari Penyedia Layanan Internet (ISP) dan siapa pun yang mengawasi koneksi Anda secara lokal dan operator situs web dan layanan yang Anda akses dan siapa pun yang mengawasinya akan melihat koneksi yang berasal dari jaringan Tor dan bukan alamat Internet (IP) Anda yang sebenarnya.
Tor VPN, perangkat lunak sumber terbuka dan gratis yang dikembangkan oleh Tor Project, adalah aplikasi bertenaga Tor yang dapat digunakan untuk merutekan aplikasi lain pada perangkat pengguna melalui jaringan Tor. Tor VPN memanfaatkan penggunaan jaringan Tor yang merutekan lalu lintas melalui relay dalam jaringan Tor. Beberapa kegunaan dan keuntungan utama menggunakan Tor VPN:
Tor VPN hanya tersedia di Android.
Tor VPN adalah perangkat lunak gratis. Gratis, baik dalam perangkat lunak bebas, dan, tersedia secara cuma-cuma. Untuk memastikan Anda menginstal Tor VPN yang benar, harap hanya unduh dari sumber resmi seperti yang disebutkan di bawah ini.
Tor VPN hanya tersedia untuk sistem operasi Android dan membutuhkan:
Tablet Android dan Chromebook tidak didukung.
Tor VPN dapat diunduh dan diinstal dari Google Play Store.
Tor VPN dapat diunduh dan dipasang dari F-Droid.
Setelah diinstal, Anda bisa meluncurkan Tor VPN dari Play Store dengan mengeklik "Open" atau dari daftar aplikasi yang diinstal pada ponsel Anda. Pada layar 'Hubungkan', secara default, semua aplikasi yang diinstal di ponsel dikonfigurasikan untuk dirutekan melalui Tor VPN dengan opsi 'Semua aplikasi terproteksi' yang diaktifkan.
Urutan layar dari peluncuran pertama hingga koneksi Tor VPN terjalin
Anda bisa mengonfigurasi Tor VPN untuk tersambung ke jaringan Tor secara otomatis dengan pengaturan koneksi yang telah disimpan sebelumnya, setiap kali aplikasi diluncurkan.
Mengonfigurasi Tor VPN agar terhubung secara otomatis setiap kali diluncurkan.
Tor VPN harus selalu diperbarui setiap saat. Jika Anda terus menggunakan versi perangkat lunak yang sudah ketinggalan zaman, Anda mungkin rentan terhadap kerentanan keamanan yang serius yang dapat membahayakan privasi dan anonimitas Anda.
Anda dapat memperbarui Tor VPN dari toko aplikasi.
Tor VPN dapat dicopot langsung dari Google Play Store, F-Droid, atau dari pengaturan aplikasi perangkat seluler Anda.
Secara default, semua aplikasi yang diinstal di ponsel Anda dikonfigurasi untuk menggunakan Tor VPN, kecuali aplikasi yang didukung oleh Tor, seperti Tor Browser untuk Android dan Orbot.
Juga memungkinkan untuk mengizinkan hanya aplikasi tertentu saja untuk menggunakan Tor VPN dan merutekannya melalui jaringan Tor.
Konfigurasi aplikasi untuk menggunakan Tor VPN
Exit relay adalah lompatan terakhir di setiap sirkuit Tor Anda. Anda bisa mengonfigurasi Tor VPN untuk hanya memilih relay keluar dari satu negara tertentu.
Saat terhubung ke jaringan Tor, situs web dan aplikasi akan menganggap Anda terhubung dari negara yang sama dengan relay keluar Tor Anda.
Untuk mengonfigurasi lokasi keluar dari koneksi Tor:
Konfigurasikan lokasi keluar koneksi Tor
'Tombol pemutus' dapat digunakan untuk memblokir aplikasi agar tidak terhubung ke internet jika jaringan Tor tidak dapat dijangkau.
Untuk mengaktifkan 'Tombol pemutus':
Konfigurasikan cara aplikasi Tor VPN ditampilkan di ponsel Anda.
Untuk mengubah tampilan ikon Aplikasi dan nama aplikasi:
Mengonfigurasi cara Tor VPN ditampilkan di perangkat Anda.
Pahami cara mengatasi sensor internet dengan Tor VPN
Akses langsung ke jaringan Tor terkadang diblokir. Ketika hal ini terjadi, Tor VPN bisa digunakan dengan alat pengelabuan sensor yang dikenal sebagai Bridges.
Setelah mengerahkan langkah-langkah pemecahan masalah yang umum, jika Tor VPN gagal memulai koneksi ke jaringan Tor, ada kemungkinan koneksi Anda ke Tor disensor. Dalam hal ini, menghubungkan dengan salah satu metode pengelabuan sensor bawaan dapat membantu.
Tor VPN mendukung jenis bridge berikut:
Tergantung di mana Anda berada, satu jenis bridge mungkin bekerja lebih baik daripada yang lain.
Jika menggunakan metode penghindaran sensor bawaan, obfs4, dan Snowflake tidak berhasil, Anda harus meminta bridge lainnya. Karena alamat bridge tidak bersifat publik, Anda harus memintanya sendiri langsung dari aplikasi:
Jika Anda telah mendapatkan bridge melalui Email atau situs web Bridges, Anda harus menambahkan bridge secara manual.
Konfigurasikan Tor VPN untuk menggunakan bridge
Troubleshoot masalah umum dan cara menghubungi dukungan saat mengalami masalah
Pemecahan masalah kesalahan umum saat menggunakan Tor VPN.
Jika Tor VPN tidak dapat terkoneksi, Anda mungkin akan melihat pesan kesalahan:
Kesalahan Koneksi pada Tor VPN.
Untuk memecahkan masalah, cobalah masing-masing hal berikut ini:
Melihat pada log Tor VPN bisa sangat membantu dalam mendiagnosis masalah ini. Untuk mengambil log Tor VPN:
00:00:00:00 W/onionmasq: onion_tunnel::runtime: Arti failed to connect to [2a00:ccc1:1:2c::1]:9000: Network is unreachable (os error 101)
00:00:00:00 W/onionmasq: tor_chanmgr::transport::default: Connection to [scrubbed] failed: error: Network is unreachable (os error 101)
00:00:00:000 E/onionmasq: onionmasq_mobile::ffi: runProxy() returned error: couldn't start onionmasq proxy
00:00:00:000 CONNECTION_ERROR
00:00:00:000 D/onionmasq: onionmasq_mobile: closing proxy...
Dalam hal ini, mencoba salah satu metode pengelakan sensor mungkin dapat berhasil.
Cara menghubungi dukungan, melaporkan bug, atau memberikan umpan balik.
Jika Anda menemukan masalah yang tidak dijawab oleh dokumentasi kami, silakan coba langkah-langkah Pemecahan Masalah. Jika hal tersebut tidak berhasil, silakan berkas bug report atau hubungi tim dukungan kami.
Saat mengirimkan permintaan dukungan, umpan balik, atau melaporkan bug, silakan sertakan informasi sebanyak mungkin:
Pada Tor Forum, buat akun untuk kirimkan topik baru. Silakan tinjau panduan diskusi kami di sini dan periksa topik yang sudah ada sebelum memposting.
Jika melaporkan bug, silakan laporkan di pelacak bug. Silakan periksa apakah bug tersebut telah dilaporkan. Untuk mencari dan melihat semua laporan bug yang terkait dengan Tor VPN, silakan buka repositori Tor VPN.
Untuk membuat laporan bug baru, silakan minta akun baru untuk mengakses instans GitLab Tor Project. Mengirimkan berkas bug ke repositori Tor VPN.
Kirimkan pesan kepada kami di @TorProjectSupportBot.
Kirimi kami email ke frontdesk@torproject.org
Pada baris subjek email Anda, beri tahu kami apa yang Anda laporkan. Semakin spesifik baris subjek Anda, semakin mudah bagi kami untuk memahami dan menindaklanjutinya. Terkadang ketika kita menerima email tanpa baris subjek, email tersebut ditandai sebagai spam.
Kirim pesan kepada kami di +447421000612.
Kirimkan pesan kepada kami di +17787431312.
Fitur dan properti keamanan Tor VPN
Dokumen ini memberikan wawasan tentang karakteristik keamanan Tor VPN, menjelaskan sifat manfaat yang ditawarkan oleh Tor VPN dan kapan manfaat tersebut berlaku. Dokumen model ancaman ini ditujukan untuk para pengembang, desainer UX, penulis dokumentasi, pelatih teknis, dan pengguna teknis.
August 6, 2025
Similar to Tor Browser, and unlike traditional VPNs, Tor VPN gives each application its own route through the Tor network. This feature prevents network adversaries from linking a user's private activity with their non-private activity.
In contrast to Tor Browser, the privacy benefits that Tor VPN provides depend highly upon the behavior of individual applications, the permissions granted to those applications, and the configuration of the base Android system.
For privacy-hostile applications in partial Tor mode, or for applications that users only occasionally use with Tor, Tor VPN provides only censorship circumvention and protection from network surveillance.
When used on properly configured privacy-enhanced Android distributions such as GrapheneOS, Tor VPN can provide additional privacy benefits even for privacy-hostile applications.
This document describes the nature of the benefits that Tor VPN provides and when they apply.
The Tor VPN threat model uses the ICTM methodology. ICTM specifies security invariants that the user can expect when using the software in a particular way or in a particular environment. An ICTM threat model starts from a point of "No Security" and adds security invariants when the software environment meets particular requirements.
We express what Tor VPN provides in terms of ICTM security invariants, which apply to specific application types and usage scenarios.
In our usage of ICTM, we define five ICTM security invariants that represent levels of privacy that Tor VPN provides. This document links these invariant terms in Capitalized Bold Italic to their definition sections.
These security invariants apply to the combination of four types of Android applications, two modes of Tor VPN (all-app or per-app), and five Android device configurations. This document links these classification terms in Capitalized Bold to their definition sections.
The combined outcome results in two threat model matrices that represent the ICTM security invariant that is active in a given situation.
The level of pseudonymity that Tor VPN provides to the user guides the overall threat model.
Tor VPN provides at least censorship circumvention to all selected apps.
Tor VPN does not magically make all apps anonymous or pseudonymous. If the user used their real name or even created their account without Tor, then they have no pseudonymity.
If the user uses a privacy-enhanced version of Android and is careful about their Google account setup and app usage, then Tor VPN can help protect the usage of a single pseudonym for the user of the device. (The user may try to use different names in different apps, but app behavior can link these pseudonyms to the Google account and/or to each other).
If the user uses privacy-preserving apps with proper configuration, then Tor VPN can enable the usage of separate pseudonyms in those apps. (When properly configured, an adversary cannot link the different pseudonyms used in distinct privacy-preserving apps).
Essentially, this threat model describes the circumstances under which the user obtains these different levels of pseudonymity protection.
The low-level VPN security properties and the ICTM security invariants support the Tor VPN threat model.
Two low-level security properties that the OnionMasq networking daemon provides support the ICTM security invariants. These low-level security properties must hold for the ICTM invariants to apply:
Network Leak Safety. Apps MUST NOT be able to bypass the VPN when it is enabled. This includes during device startup, if the VPN is not connected yet, or if the network is temporarily disconnected. The VPN industry calls this property a "Kill Switch", "Always On VPN Lockdown", or "On Demand". The Always-on Lockdown feature of Android 8 and above provides this property.
Network App Isolation. All network activity of each Tor-routed app MUST be isolated from other apps by using its own dedicated Tor circuit(s). Specific apps MAY bypass Tor entirely if the user chooses to allow this. API ConnectivityManager dari Android 10 dan yang lebih baru menyediakan properti ini.
These are the security invariants that Tor VPN is capable of providing to individual apps. To simplify activation conditions, some invariants inherit the properties of earlier ones. We list these inherited invariants under each invariant.
The high-level conceptualization to keep in mind is that we are defining distinctions in the level of pseudonymity that the user can expect for an app: no pseudonymity, multi-app shared pseudonymity, per-app pseudonymity, and anonymity.
The next section lists the activation conditions under which they apply.
NOTE: Linkable Pseudonymity is a fragile state. As pseudonymous activity is linked together, the odds increase that there is some way to deanonymize some of that activity, thus deanonymizing all of it. One can conceptualize this invariant as providing "Multi-App Shared Pseudonymity," where all apps with Linkable Pseudonymity on the device effectively share the same pseudonym. This is why we require either the Pseudonymous Google Configuration or Google-Free Configuration for apps to gain this invariant. (Pseudonymity would otherwise vanish as soon as it was linked to a non-pseudonymous Google account.)
NOTE: One can conceptualize this invariant as providing "Per-App Pseudonymity." Because of Tor VPN's Network App Isolation, when this invariant is active for an app, its activity cannot be linked to non-private activity on the device. This is not the case for traditional VPNs, which allow the VPN operator and VPN endpoint observers to link such activity.
Our security invariants activate depending on what type of app is in use, the Tor VPN mode (per-app or all-apps), and properties of the base OS and configuration.
The lowest numbered invariant where an app matches these clauses is the invariant for that app.
A device may have multiple apps operating at different security invariant levels, depending on these conditions.
The Threat Model Matrices present this same activation information in table form.
Rationale: Surprisingly, this is a common failure mode for VPN apps among people who do not understand how they work.
Rationale: We cannot provide any additional security to a device that is already vulnerable to unfixed, publicly disclosed security flaws. We assume these public flaws can subvert any privacy or security properties the user would hope to gain by running Tor VPN.
Rationale: In per-app mode, apps that are not selected for Tor use get no protection. (Though they could if we implemented a per-app network block feature).
Rationale: Privacy-hostile applications can trick the user into opening URLs in apps that are not selected to use Tor and can link non-Tor activity to their activity.
Rationale: On all versions of Android, Privacy-hostile applications can use the
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATEAndroid permission to determine the SIM card IP address and can engage in data sharing with the ISP, which removes Network Privacy. On Stock Google Android (but not GrapheneOS), they can bind to the cell network interface to directly bypass the VPN for arbitrary network connections.
Rationale: We assume unmasked apps have no pseudonymity.
Rationale: Privacy-hostile apps can link their activity to the user's real name and Google account unless the user takes further steps.
Rationale: Pseudonym-friendly apps can be accidentally linked to a user's real name and Google account through push notifications, phone number authentication, and other mechanisms, unless the user takes further steps.
Rationale: The usage of Google push notifications links the pseudonymous app to the device's Google account, which is also pseudonymous in this configuration.
Rationale: Privacy-hostile apps can cooperate with other privacy-hostile apps on the phone to link activity, even without a device Google account.
Rationale: These device configurations prevent linkability of the pseudonymous app to the device's Google account.
Rationale: This device configuration isolates privacy-hostile apps from the device's Google account and from each other.
Rationale: Anonymity apps have no other identifiers other than the current IP address, which is now a Tor exit IP address.
As can be seen, our security invariants depend upon the app type and the Android device configuration. In this section, we define those applications and configurations specifically.
We classify Android applications into four types:
NOTE: Once an app is unmasked on a device, creating a new pseudonymous account in the same app does not remove this classification. In fact, due to the Android ID identifier behavior, deleting the app and reinstalling it in the same profile still allows a new pseudonym to be linked to the deleted one. A user must use the Isolated User Profile Configuration to create a new device user profile to use the app in an unlinkable way with respect to the current profile's Android ID for that app.
Architecturally, Tor VPN is capable of providing a high degree of unlinkability to applications on the same device, as we can see from the security invariants. Unfortunately, Android is an extremely privacy-invasive platform. The Android ecosystem has been built upon the same advertising model that the web has been built upon. Because Google controls Android and is the primary benefactor (if not sole conduit) of Android advertising revenue, Google designed the platform to maximize the ability to track usage and to link user activity together to build a comprehensive advertising profile of the user. This linkability is problematic even for apps that provide pseudonymity as a design goal, merely through their usage of the system APIs. The primary way that the system subverts pseudonymity is by associating the pseudonym with the Google account, most often through push notifications, but also through associating location information with the Android Advertising ID. On a stock Google Android, the device's Google account gets full device information: serial number, IMEI, IMSI, phone number, WiFi MAC address, full location history, and installed application list. We assume that any linking mechanism to the stock Android Google account provides deanonymization of a pseudonym. In these cases, apps can gain Network Privacy at most. The good news is that there are ways of configuring an Android device that improve the ICTM security invariant that Tor VPN can provide:
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission, which gives access to all IP addresses on the device, along with a lot of other network interface information that can be used to track the user. For a good overview of all the information that is available by default, install Network Analyzer or use the Device ID test in our VPN Test App. Unfortunately, even privacy-preserving Android distributions such as GrapheneOS do not provide the ability to redact non-VPN network information and non-VPN IP addresses when a VPN is active. Additionally, on stock Android, apps can bypass the VPN interface by binding to the cell network interface, regardless of Always-on and Block Connections Android settings. Until those tickets are fixed:
When these properties are met, the app will not be linked to the device's Google account, which is a common source of deanonymization.
NOTE: Removing push notification permission is NOT ENOUGH to prevent apps from being able to register with Firebase (Google) to receive a push token that links the app to the Google account. See the Push Notification section of Known Weaknesses for more information. For now, if an app does not provide settings to disable notification registration, then you must use one of the following configurations instead. (For example: Session Messenger allows push registration to be disabled or switched to non-Google; Signal currently offers no such configuration).
It turns out that from the point of view of our ICTM security invariants, both of these are equivalent: they both result in Linkable Pseudonymity for both pseudonym-friendly apps and privacy-hostile apps because they significantly reduce the amount of linkable information, but they do not eliminate it. The primary reason is due to the remaining push notification linkability. See the Push Notification Linkability section of Known Weakness for more info. If the push notification linkability weakness is mitigated, then pseudonym-friendly apps will have Unlinkable Pseudonymity in this configuration when using push notifications. The first option accepts linkability through the Google account but mitigates deanonymization through careful management of this Google account. In this configuration, the user creates a new Google account over Tor and relies on the GrapheneOS Google Sandbox to provide pseudonymity for the device's Google account. In this sandbox, the system treats Google as a normal app, with revocable permissions and no access to hardware identifiers. Additionally, GrapheneOS requires the user to manually disable the Android Advertising ID. Doing so eliminates a large source of excess linkability. The Android Advertising ID is heavily used to link pseudonyms to location data. In the second option, the user configures a new privacy-enhanced Android device without a Google account but still uses push notifications with sandboxed Google Play Services on GrapheneOS. The user can use F-Droid or Aurora Store to install apps without a Google account. Without a Google account, there is less linkability risk between apps through other Google APIs other than push.
NOTE: The device must always use Tor to avoid linking its device push registration to a non-Tor IP address. This may be problematic in censorship scenarios where configuration information is delivered over push notifications. In this case, without a device Google account, it may be possible to clear registration data and re-register to remove linkability. But the effectiveness of this will depend on the data retention duration of the services involved for expired push tokens. See the Push Notification Linkability section of Known Weaknesses.
- These properties define this configuration:
- Configure with the IP Address Privacy Configuration to prevent Google Services and hostile apps from using the cell IP address for linkability.
- Optional Google Account Config:
- Create a new pseudonymous Google account over Tor for the device, using an SMS or VoIP phone number.
- The Android Advertising ID of this account has been disabled.
- Do not use the device phone number or Google account for app registration. Use a different online SMS or VoIP provider over Tor.
- If Tor VPN is in per-app mode, all Google Play Services and Google apps must be selected to use Tor in this configuration.
- Disable Private DNS and Connectivity Checks.
The active security invariant for a given scenario can be summarized in two matrices: one for Tor VPN per-app mode and one for Tor VPN all-app mode. These two matrices exactly represent the ICTM security invariant clauses from Section 2.3.
In this section, we list the known weaknesses of both stock Android and privacy-enhancing Android, where fixing a weakness would significantly improve the available security invariants.
For each weakness, we list the Consequences for the user and the mitigating configurations the user must perform, when possible.
We also provide fix Recommendations for developers of GrapheneOS, Android, and pseudonym-friendly apps.
The following Android privacy issues apply to all Android versions, including GrapheneOS and CalyxOS.
In all versions of Android, when apps have the ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission (which nearly all Android apps have), they can examine properties of all network interfaces, including the IP address. For a good overview of all the information that is available by default, install Network Analyzer or use our VPN Leak Test App.
Consequences: This weakness prevents Tor VPN from providing Network Privacy (or further invariants) to Privacy-hostile apps. This weakness also exposes the user to IP address leaks even for Pseudonym-friendly apps that disclose all device IP addresses during WebRTC calls. In both cases, the user must use their phone with a mobile WiFi hotspot, rather than a SIM card, to mitigate this weakness.
Recommendation: When a VPN is enabled, the Android OS should simulate non-VPN interfaces as disconnected, or it should spoof unused RFC1918 addresses for non-VPN interfaces. If addresses are spoofed, the system should not provide the same values to all apps, to prevent the use of spoofed values as identifiers (which likely already happens with IP address values today). These mitigations are essential because they enable VPNs to provide Network Privacy. Most VPN users naturally want their IP addresses to be unavailable to apps for tracking purposes.
All versions of Android (and also all versions of iOS) are currently subject to linkability through push notifications, even when the user has denied push notification permission to all apps.
When registering for Google's Firebase push notifications, apps obtain an FCM "token" from Firebase, which they submit to their servers. Their servers use this token to deliver messages to Google, who then uses the token ID to look up the device and send it the message.
Our VPN Leak Test App verifies that this registration ability is possible without any push notification permission, in the Device ID test.
This means that a series of record requests (sent first to the app developers and then to Google) will discover the Google account in use with a particular app. From there, even if there is no device Google account, the other push tokens associated with the device can be used to make further record requests to other app service providers for account data associated with their respective token IDs.
Because Google (and many apps) operate internationally, these requests can come from arbitrary jurisdictions. The Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law in China is one such example of a law that can be used for this purpose, although no direct reports of China using push notifications have been made public. It seems likely that Wyden's concerns did not come from nowhere, though.
This linkability is possible even for apps like Signal that do not send any actual content in the push notification and use it only as a wake-up notification. Because Signal still stores the token ID with the user's account on their servers, this linkability also exists for them.
This makes it impossible to have distinct pseudonyms for Signal, or any other app that registers with FCM, unless the user configures their device without Google Play Services or creates a separate user profile without Google Services for these apps.
Consequences: This weakness makes the Pseudonymous App Configuration impossible for many apps, because FCM push registration cannot actually be disabled by the user by denying push notification permission to an app. It also makes Pseudonymous Google Configuration have far more app linkability to the Google account (or device) than would otherwise be the case, linking many privacy-hostile apps to Google and to other pseudonym-friendly apps. The user has no real mitigation options, because disabling push notifications still allows this registration and resulting linkability.
Recommendations:
There are a few different approaches that can reduce the user's exposure to this linkability:
In our testing, we discovered that apps can bypass the VPN by using mDNS requests and SSDP activity. We have a reproduction case in our VPN Leak Test App. This test leaks on all versions of Android, including GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS has attempted to fix some multicast leaks, but our test app shows that these fixes are insufficient.
Additionally, these multicast leaks enable privacy-hostile apps to communicate on a local network, further linking user pseudonyms to other app activity on that same network.
This behavior is also observed in the wild, with Spotify engaging in communication over the local network through this bypass mechanism.
Consequences: This weakness allows Privacy-hostile apps to communicate on the local network to link their usage to other users on the network.
Recommendation: The Android OS should route this multicast behavior through the VPN interface. This will enable the VPN app to decide whether to allow these local network connections.
The Android ID is essentially a 64-bit identifier that is shared by all apps in a user profile with the same signing key.
This identifier persists across re-installations of the same app, which can be verified using our VPN Leak Test App using the Device Identifier test. Users who expect to be able to delete an app and then reinstall it to sign in under a different pseudonym will have their pseudonyms linked by Privacy-hostile apps that make use of this identifier.
Consequences: This weakness prevents users from being able to reinstall apps to change pseudonyms without linking those pseudonyms together. Basically, due to this weakness, once an app is linked to the user's real identity on a profile, that app will always be an Unmasked App, even after reinstallation. Users must install that app in a separate profile to avoid this linkability.
Recommendation: This ID should be randomized with every app installation, rather than persisting after uninstallation. This will allow users to delete an app to change pseudonyms.
For some reason, no Android permissions are necessary to determine the cell network ID and the provider name of the user's SIM card. This information can be used to determine the user's rough geographic location, depending on the range of the cell provider (typically at least country-level, but sometimes regional, state, or province-level). The Device ID test of our VPN Leak Test app displays this information. It is also visible in Network Analyzer.
Consequences: This weakness does not directly impact any of our privacy invariants, but it is generally bad for privacy.
Recommendation: These APIs should always return NULL/empty (the default when no eSIMs are configured), because this information is not necessary for app operation.
We observed that when WiFi calling is enabled for an activated eSIM, the device makes IPsec connections to the eSIM provider, bypassing the VPN.
Consequences: This weakness does not directly impact any of our privacy invariants, but it is generally bad for privacy in that it exposes the user's WiFi IP address to their cell network.
Recommendation: Allow VPN interfaces control of routing this connection, so that it may be disabled if the user chooses to block it.
Stock Android has a number of edge cases that can leak DNS or multicast, which can remove the Network Privacy invariant by revealing to the local network that a particular app may be in use.
Stock Android allows apps to bind to the cell network interface and then connect to an IP address, bypassing any VPN in place, regardless of Always-On or Block Connections VPN settings. Our VPN Test App has a reproduction case for this as part of the Leak Test. This leak is only possible over the cell network interface.
GrapheneOS fixed this issue in the 2025072700 Release.
Consequences: This leak allows Privacy-hostile apps to remove Network Privacy on stock Android. Users must use the IP Address Privacy Configuration and/or use GrapheneOS to prevent this leak.
Recommendations: Google shouldn't allow rogue apps to bind to the cell interface to bypass the VPN in Lockdown Mode, because VPN users expect that apps can't bypass the VPN in this mode.
On stock Android, user profile isolation can leak packets upon first use after restart.
Consequences: This leak prevents stock Android users from successfully using Isolated User Profile Configuration to isolate sensitive app activity. Users have to install GrapheneOS to mitigate this.
Recommendation: These leaks should be fixed, because users expect Always on VPN and Block Connection settings to work in all user profiles.
On stock Android, the device Google account has access to all hardware identifiers, as well as SIM card identifiers and phone number. This access typically means that any form of linking to the device Google account (through push notifications, Gmail use, or Google OAuth sign-in) typically means deanonymization of a pseudonym.
Consequences: It is difficult for a user to maintain a pseudonym even in Pseudonym-friendly apps without careful configuration.
Recommendations: Both privacy-conscious apps and Google should have more transparency with respect to actions that link the app's account to the device Google account, because users tend to expect that pseudonymity is not actively subverted behind their backs. In the meantime, the GrapheneOS Google Sandbox enables Pseudonymous Google Configuration.
Multiple issues with DNS exist in stock Android. Apps that use getaddrinfo() from the C library can bypass the VPN. Our VPN Leak Test app reproduces this leak as part of the main Leak Test.
Additional, DNS leaks can happen if the VPN malfunctions or shuts down.
Consequences: DNS leaks can erode Network Privacy by allowing local ISPs to determine which apps are in use. Users must use GrapheneOS to avoid these leaks.
Recommendations: GrapheneOS has fixed these issues. Google Android should upstream these fixes, because users expect that their DNS activity will not bypass their VPN.
Android has a secure setting Settings.Secure.always_on_vpn_lockdown_whitelist, which allows custom Android builds to define a list of apps that always bypass the VPN, regardless of VPN settings. Google and GrapheneOS both have this setting empty, but third-party Android builds may place their apps in this setting. The ReThink Firewall App has a ticket describing this issue.
Google Android also allows connectivity checks to bypass the VPN. GrapheneOS provides a setting to disable this.
Consequences: On Android rebuilds, various vendor apps may be exempted from the VPN, allowing them to connect outside of it. Users must use GrapheneOS to avoid these leaks.
Recommendations: Users should disable or remove vendor apps that they don't need.
The following weaknesses are unique to GrapheneOS. Note that the universal Android weaknesses also apply to GrapheneOS.
Additionally, the default-on behavior of the Android Advertising ID is another source of linkability between apps. GrapheneOS requires users to manually disable this ID, but this is not prominently documented during setup.
A better default would be to have the Android Advertising ID disabled by default or to provide a prominent setup step that educates users about this privacy risk.
We list this as a GrapheneOS-specific weakness because other privacy-preserving versions of Android randomize this ID automatically.
Consequences: Users who are not aware that they need to configure their Google account to disable this identifier will have all of their Privacy-hostile app activity linked to their Google account and to each other. Users must manually disable the Advertising ID in their Google account settings.
Rekomendasi: Mirip dengan cara GrapheneOS memproksi API Lokasi, API ini harus diproksi untuk mengembalikan angka acak atau nol, karena API ini merupakan sumber keterkaitan yang sangat invasif yang memungkinkan pengumpulan data lokasi dan penggunaan di berbagai aplikasi.
Ada beberapa cara yang dapat Anda gunakan untuk menghubungi Tor Project, serta informasi apa yang perlu Anda sertakan agar kami dapat menyelesaikan masalah Anda dengan cepat.
Tor mengandalkan dukungan dari pengguna dan sukarelawan di seluruh dunia untuk membantu meningkatkan perangkat lunak dan sumber daya kami, jadi umpan balik Anda sangat berharga untuk kami (dan untuk semua pengguna Tor).
Saat mengirimkan umpan balik atau melaporkan bug kepada kami, mohon sertakan sebanyak mungkin:
Ada beberapa cara untuk menghubungi kami, jadi silakan gunakan cara yang terbaik menurut Anda.
Kami sarankan untuk meminta bantuan di Forum Tor. Anda perlu membuat akun untuk mengirimkan topik baru. Sebelum Anda bertanya, silakan tinjau panduan diskusi kami di sini. Saat ini, untuk mendapatkan jawaban tercepat, silakan tulis dalam bahasa Inggris. Jika Anda menemukan bug, silakan gunakan GitLab.
Pertama, periksa apakah bug tersebut sudah diketahui. Anda dapat mencari dan membaca semua permasalahan di https://gitlab.torproject.org/. Untuk membuat permasalahan baru, silakan request a new account untuk mengakses instans GitLab Tor Project dan find the right repository untuk melaporkan permasalahan Anda. Atau Anda dapat melaporkan bug atau mengirimkan umpan balik secara anonim melalui Anon Ticket tanpa perlu membuat akun. Kami melacak semua masalah terkait Tor Browser di pelacak masalah Tor Browser. Permasalahan terkait situs web kami harus dimasukkan ke dalam Web issue tracker.
Jika Anda membutuhkan bantuan untuk menginstal atau memecahkan masalah pada Tor Browser dan Tor Forum diblokir atau disensor di tempat Anda berada, Anda dapat menghubungi kami di Telegram https://t.me/TorProjectSupportBot. Seorang spesialis dukungan Tor akan membantu Anda.
Anda dapat menghubungi tim dukungan kami melalui pesan teks ke nomor WhatsApp kami: +447421000612. Layanan ini hanya tersedia untuk pesan teks; video atau panggilan tidak didukung.
Anda dapat menghubungi tim kami dengan mengirimkan pesan teks ke nomor Signal kami, +17787431312, atau nama pengguna Signal, @torsupport.89. Signal adalah aplikasi perpesanan gratis dan berfokus pada privasi. Layanan ini hanya tersedia untuk pesan teks; video atau panggilan tidak didukung. Setelah mengirim pesan, agen dukungan kami akan memandu Anda dan membantu memecahkan masalah Anda.
Kirimi kami email ke frontdesk@torproject.org.
Di baris subjek email Anda, silakan beri tahu kami apa yang Anda laporkan. Semakin spesifik baris subjek Anda (misalnya "Kegagalan koneksi", "umpan balik di situs web", "umpan balik di Tor Browser, "Saya memerlukan bridge") maka semakin mudah bagi kami untuk memahami dan menindaklanjuti. Terkadang saat kami menerima email tanpa baris subjek, email tersebut akan ditandai sebagai spam dan kami tidak melihatnya.
Untuk respons tercepat, silakan tulis dalam bahasa Inggris, Spanyol, dan/atau Portugis jika Anda bisa. Jika tidak satu pun dari bahasa ini yang cocok untuk Anda, silakan tulis dalam bahasa apa pun yang Anda rasa nyaman, tetapi perlu diingat bahwa kami akan membutuhkan waktu lebih lama untuk menjawab karena kami memerlukan bantuan terjemahan untuk memahaminya.
Anda selalu dapat meninggalkan komentar pada postingan blog yang terkait dengan masalah atau umpan balik yang ingin Anda laporkan. Jika tidak ada artikel blog yang terkait dengan masalah Anda, silakan hubungi kami dengan cara lain.
Anda dapat menemukan kami di saluran #tor di OFTC atau di #tor:matrix.org untuk memberikan umpan balik atau melaporkan bug/masalah. Kami mungkin tidak langsung merespons, tetapi kami akan memeriksa backlog dan akan menghubungi Anda ketika kami bisa.
Pelajari cara terhubung ke server OFTC.
Untuk melaporkan masalah atau umpan balik menggunakan milis, kami sarankan agar Anda melakukannya di milis yang terkait dengan apa yang ingin Anda laporkan. Direktori lengkap milis kami dapat ditemukan di sini.
Untuk umpan balik atau masalah yang berkaitan dengan menjalankan relay Tor: tor-relays
Jika Anda menemukan masalah keamanan, silakan kirim email ke security@torproject.org.
Jika Anda ingin mengenkripsi email Anda, Anda dapat memperoleh kunci publik OpenPGP untuk alamat ini dari keys.openpgp.org. Ini adalah sidik jari saat ini:
835B 4E04 F6F7 4211 04C4 751A 3EF9 EF99 6604 DE41
Jika Anda ingin berpartisipasi dalam program bug bounty, perlu diketahui, mengirimkan masalah keamanan ke situs web pihak ketiga memiliki risiko tertentu yang tidak dapat kami kendalikan, oleh karena itu kami lebih memilih untuk melaporkannya secara langsung.
Temukan cara untuk menghubungi Tor Project untuk mendapatkan dukungan, melaporkan bug, dan memberikan umpan balik.
Saat mengirimkan permintaan dukungan, umpan balik, atau melaporkan bug, silakan sertakan informasi sebanyak mungkin:
Senin hingga Kamis: saluran dukungan pengguna kami melalui email, Telegram, WhatsApp, dan Signal beroperasi.
Jumat hingga Minggu: Layanan bantuan tidak beroperasi. Silakan tenang, tim kami akan membalas pesan Anda pada hari Senin.
Ada beberapa cara untuk menghubungi kami, jadi silakan gunakan cara yang terbaik menurut Anda.
Kami memiliki beberapa bot dan saluran Telegram resmi:
Kami merekomendasikan untuk meminta bantuan di Forum Tor. Anda harus membuat akun untuk mengirimkan topik baru. Silakan tinjau panduan diskusi kami dan periksa topik yang ada sebelum bertanya. Saat ini, untuk mendapatkan jawaban tercepat, silakan tulis dalam bahasa Inggris. Jika Anda menemukan bug, silakan gunakan GitLab.
Anda dapat menghubungi tim dukungan kami melalui pesan teks ke nomor WhatsApp kami: +447421000612. Layanan ini hanya tersedia untuk pesan teks; video atau panggilan tidak didukung.
Anda dapat menghubungi tim kami dengan mengirimkan pesan teks ke nomor Signal kami, +17787431312, atau nama pengguna Signal, @torsupport.89. Signal adalah aplikasi perpesanan gratis dan berfokus pada privasi. Saat ini, saluran dukungan kami tersedia dalam bahasa Inggris, Rusia, dan Persia, dan berfokus pada membantu pengguna Tor di wilayah yang diblokir. Layanan ini hanya tersedia untuk pesan teks; video atau panggilan tidak didukung. Setelah mengirim pesan, agen dukungan kami akan memandu Anda dan membantu memecahkan masalah Anda.
Kirimi kami email ke frontdesk@torproject.org
Di baris subjek email Anda, silakan beri tahu kami apa yang Anda laporkan. Semakin spesifik baris subjek Anda (misalnya "Kegagalan koneksi", "umpan balik di situs web", "umpan balik di Tor Browser, "Saya memerlukan bridge") maka semakin mudah bagi kami untuk memahami dan menindaklanjuti. Terkadang saat kami menerima email tanpa baris subjek, email tersebut akan ditandai sebagai spam dan kami tidak melihatnya.
Untuk respons tercepat, silakan tulis dalam bahasa Inggris, Rusia, Persia, Spanyol, Hindi, Bengali, dan/atau Portugis jika Anda bisa. Jika tidak satu pun dari bahasa ini yang cocok untuk Anda, silakan tulis dalam bahasa apa pun yang Anda rasa nyaman, tetapi perlu diingat bahwa kami akan membutuhkan waktu lebih lama untuk menjawab karena kami memerlukan bantuan terjemahan untuk memahaminya.
Anda dapat menemukan kami di saluran #tor pada OFTC atau Tor User Support channel pada Matrix. Kami mungkin tidak segera merespons, tetapi kami pasti memeriksa backlog dan akan segera merespons Anda begitu kami bisa.
Pelajari cara terhubung ke server OFTC.
Pertama, periksa apakah bug tersebut sudah diketahui. Anda dapat mencari dan membaca semua permasalahan di https://gitlab.torproject.org/. Untuk membuat permasalahan baru, silakan request a new account untuk mengakses instans GitLab Tor Project dan find the right repository untuk melaporkan permasalahan Anda. Kami melacak semua masalah terkait Tor Browser di pelacak masalah Tor Browser. Permasalahan terkait situs web kami harus dimasukkan ke dalam Web issue tracker.